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ROBERT KNOWLES* AND MARC D. FALKOFF**
INTRODUCTION
The United States military’s detention of hundreds of men at
the Naval Base at Guanta´namo Bay since January 2002 has drawn
intense international condemnation, focused mainly on the United
States’ refusal to afford the detainees minimal due process protec-
tions.1  For years the Bush administration has maintained that the
detainees possess no rights that can be vindicated in domestic U.S.
courts, implicitly contending that, at least with respect to executive
detentions, Guanta´namo is a legal black hole.2  The Supreme Court
rejected this extreme position in June 2004 in Rasul v. Bush, ruling
that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions
from the Guanta´namo detainees and strongly implying that the de-
tainees possess some constitutional rights.3 Rasul, however, did not
* Acting Assistant Professor of Lawyering, New York University School of
Law.  J.D., Northwestern University School of Law; B.A., St. Olaf College.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
J.D., Columbia Law School; Ph.D., Brandeis University; M.A., University of
Michigan, Ann Arbor; B.A., University of Pennsylvania.
1. See, e.g., Jamie Doward & Mark Townsend, Attorney General Calls for Guanta´-
namo to Close, THE GUARDIAN (London), May 7, 2006, at 3 (discussing the state-
ments of U.K. Attorney General Lord Goldsmith); Editorial, Free U.S. Captives or
Charge Them, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 20, 2006, at A14; Warren Hoge, Investigators for
U.N. Urge U.S. to Close Guanta´namo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A6.
2. See, e.g., Response to Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Motion to Dis-
miss or for Judgment as a Matter of Law & Memorandum in Support at 2-3, Abdah
v. Bush, No. 04-125 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2004) (“The notion that the U.S. Constitution
affords due process and other rights to enemy aliens captured abroad and con-
fined outside the sovereign territory of the United States is contrary to law and
history. . . . Similarly, petitioners’ other claims — whether under the Constitution,
international treaties and conventions that are not self-executing, statutory provi-
sions, or military regulations — have no merit.”).  The description of Guanta´namo
as a “legal black hole” was first offered by British Lord Steyn as a critique of the
extrajudicial detentions at the prison camp. See Johan Steyn, Guanta´namo Bay: The
Legal Black Hole, Twenty-Seventh FA Mann Lecture at the British Institute of International
and Comparative Law (Nov. 25, 2003) in 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004), available at
http://www.nimj.com/documents/Guantanamo.pdf.
3. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481, 484 (2004) (holding that federal courts
have jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions by foreign nationals imprisoned at
637
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address the question of which constitutional rights Guanta´namo de-
tainees possess and why.4
This issue was reached, however, at the district court level, re-
sulting in two conflicting decisions.5  Senior Judge Joyce Hens
Green, before whom most of the Guanta´namo habeas petitions had
been coordinated, reasoned that fundamental due process protec-
tions are available to the detainees because Guanta´namo, which is
under the complete jurisdiction and control of the United States, is
not really “extraterritorial” in anything but a formal sense.6  Thus
her opinion sidestepped the question of whether constitutional
rights apply extraterritorially.  Addressing the claims of seven peti-
tioners whose cases were not consolidated before Judge Green,
Judge Leon reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the de-
tainee petitioners lacked any enforceable constitutional, statutory,
or treaty rights, and that they could not otherwise assert a “viable
legal theory” that would entitle them to challenge their detention.7
The conflicting opinions of Judge Green and Judge Leon were
appealed to the D.C. Circuit soon after the decisions were issued in
early 2005.  The question of the extraterritorial application of the
Guanta´namo Bay Naval Base in Cuba). See also infra notes 4 and 5, and accompa-
nying text.  In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court held that military commission proce-
dures – specifically designed to try a small number of these detainees for war
crimes – were not authorized by law.  126 S.Ct. 2749, 2754-55 (2006).  In doing so,
the Court concluded that Guanta´namo detainees possessed certain rights under
the Geneva Conventions, but it did not address the question of constitutional
rights. Id. at 2755-56.
4. In a revealing footnote in Rasul, the Court intimated that the petitioners
do possess constitutional rights:
Petitioners’ allegations – that, although they have engaged neither in combat
nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in Exec-
utive detention for more than two years in territory subject to the long-term,
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, without access to coun-
sel and without being charged with any wrongdoing – unquestionably de-
scribe “custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.”
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698 n.15 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000) and citing
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring)).  The Court remanded to the district court, in which the Government
would “make their response” to the petitions and the court would “consider in the
first instance the merits of petitioners’ claims.” Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698.
5. In re Guanta´namo Bay Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C.
2005) (rejecting the government’s contention that habeas petitions should be dis-
missed because foreign nationals detained in Guanta´namo enjoy no substantive
rights whatsoever).
6. See In re Guanta´namo Bay Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
7. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005).
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Constitution to non-citizens, at least in the Guanta´namo context,
thus looked ripe for resolution, first by the Court of Appeals and
then, inevitably, by the Supreme Court.  Foot-dragging by the D.C.
Circuit and intervening legislation, however, delayed the day of
reckoning.  In December 2005, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act, which ostensibly removed jurisdiction from the fed-
eral courts to hear any action brought by a person being detained
at Guanta´namo.8  But in June 2006, the Supreme Court ruled in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that Congress did not intend for the DTA to
have retroactive effect.9  In October 2006, after the Court of Ap-
peals had still not issued a ruling in the Guanta´namo cases, Con-
gress again stepped into the fray and passed the Military
Commissions Act,10 which among other things includes stronger—
though by no means definitive—language concerning the intended
retroactive effect of the DTA procedures.
Finally, in February 2007, more than two years after Judges
Green and Leon issued their decisions, the Court of Appeals held
in Boumediene v. Bush that the Guanta´namo detainee cases must be
dismissed.11  Over a dissent, the panel ruled that Congress intended
the MCA to have retroactive effect and that the federal courts no
longer had jurisdiction over the pending habeas cases.12  In reach-
ing this decision, the panel determined that Congress’s stripping of
habeas jurisdiction for the detainees was not an unconstitutional
suspension of habeas corpus, because (1) “the Suspension Clause
protects the writ ‘as it existed in 1789’”;13 (2) the privilege of the
writ did not then extend to aliens outside the sovereign’s terri-
8. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005 (2005) [here-
inafter DTA].  Congress did provide for a form of anemic judicial review in the
Court of Appeals of military determinations that a detainee is an “enemy combat-
ant,” as well as whether the use of standards and procedures devised by the military
in reaching its internal determination that a detainee is an “enemy combatant” is
“consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Id.  The same
logic would appear to apply to petitions challenging their detention qua detention,
but the Court refrained from ruling on that question, see id., and the Government
continues to argue that the DTA should have retroactive effect for detainees who
are challenging their detention, see id.
9. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2815 (2006).
10. Military Commissions Act of 2006, S. 3930, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinaf-
ter MCA].
11. No. 05-5062, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 2007).
12. Id. at *10-16.
13. Id. at *17 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301(2001)).  It is worth
noting that the D.C. Circuit engages in some strangely selective quotation here.
The Court in St. Cyr actually stated that, “at the absolute minimum, the Suspension
Clause protects the writ ‘as it existed in 1789.’” 533 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added).
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tory;14 and (3) even though the U.S. maintains complete dominion
and control over Guanta´namo, it is not U.S. territory for constitu-
tional purposes.15
The issuance of the D.C. Circuit’s Boumediene decision is a fasci-
nating development for the authors of this article.16  As lawyers
deeply involved in the representation of seventeen Yemeni detain-
ees who have been held without charge or trial for five years in
Guanta´namo, practicalities had driven us to think creatively about
the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution.  We refused to accept
without question the stale and typically overbroad Supreme Court
pronouncements on the issue—which we review in detail below—
and found the academic literature on the subject to be reflexively
conservative in its approach.  In other words, we turned to this issue
with the intention of reopening heretofore closed debates about
extraterritorial constitutionality because a new context, a new type
of war, and a newly effectuated doctrine of executive overreach de-
manded it.
Before Boumediene, the question of the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Constitution to non-citizens in the Guanta´namo context
saw advocates on both sides of the debate staking out predictable
positions.  Human rights advocates and government lawyers prop-
erly saw the Guanta´namo litigation as a first sparring ground for
looming battles involving invocation of the Constitution’s protec-
tions for detainees kept in U.S. detention centers in Afghanistan
and Iraq, and even in the CIA “black sites” where high-value detain-
ees have been kept incommunicado in undisclosed locations.17  But
their legal arguments seemed, in a word, stale.
14. Boumediene, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 at *17-25.
15. Id. at *29.
16. The Supreme Court denied the detainees’ petition for a writ of certiorari
in Boumediene shortly before this article went to print.  127 S. Ct. 1478 (2007).
17. See, e.g., Carlotta Gall, Rights Group Reports Afghanistan Torture, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2005, at A14 (“Eight men at the American detention camp in Guanta´-
namo Bay have separately given their lawyers ‘consistent accounts’ of being tor-
tured at a secret prison in Afghanistan at various periods from 2002 to 2004 . . . .”);
Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees
Was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32, 37 (describing the press’ allega-
tion of C.I.A. personnel mistreating prisoners in secret Afghani prison); Dana
Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at A01;
Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, Sources Tell ABC News Top Al Qaeda Figures Held in
Secret CIA Prisons, ABC NEWS, Dec. 5, 2005, available at http://abcnews.go.com/
WNT/investigation/story?id=1375123; Scott Shane & Margot Williams, Yemenis
Freed After Transfer From Secret Prisons, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2006, at A10;
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES’ “DISAPPEARED”: THE CIA’S LONG-TERM
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We perceive that the most important flaw in present academic
theories on extraterritorial constitutionality is a disregard for what
should be a central inquiry in analyzing any exercise of government
power over an individual: whether the government has exceeded its
constitutional mandate, irrespective of the rights the Constitution
may afford to that individual.  We believe—and argue below—that
a proper analysis of this issue should begin with whether the U.S.
government, in detaining aliens outside its own territory indefi-
nitely, has exceeded the powers granted to it by the Constitution.
This determination should precede a focus on whether non-citizens
abroad have rights, and if so, which ones they possess.  The result is
a two-step approach that first analyzes limits and then analyzes
rights.  We call our approach a limited-government theory.18  Al-
though we recognize that a limited-government understanding of
the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution has never gained
much of a foothold among legal scholars, the present trend toward
extraterritorial detention suggests it is time to reevaluate the useful-
ness of this approach.  Indeed, we contend that a limited-govern-
ment theory not only accords with our common-sense intuition
about the proper functioning of our government abroad but also
serves to reconcile seemingly inconsistent holdings from the Su-
preme Court with respect to the constitutional limits on extraterri-
torial exercises of U.S. government power.19
We were gratified, therefore, to find that Judge Judith W. Rog-
ers, in her scholarly dissent in Boumediene, adopted a position very
“GHOST DETAINEES” (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/
us1004/us1004.pdf.
The United States, in its prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui, relied, in part, on
a summary of a “statement” provided by prisoner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed from
an undisclosed location. See Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mo-
hammed, United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F.3d 292, 334-25 (4th Cir. 2004) available
at http://img.slate.com/media/71/sheikmohammed.pdf.  Although the Govern-
ment refused for years to acknowledge that it maintained “black sites,” it recently
confirmed the existence (though not the location) of the sites, after moving four-
teen “high value” detainees to Guanta´namo in the fall of 2006. See Dan Eggen &
Dafna Linzer, Secret World of Detainees Grows More Public, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2006,
at A18.
18. We are not the first to use this term. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Guan-
tanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2035 n.89
(2005).
19. Our approach is consistent with that proposed by the Restatement of For-
eign Relations (Third), published in 1986—before the Supreme Court’s decision
in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), which stated that “at least
some actions by the United States in respect of foreign nationals outside the coun-
try are also subject to constitutional limitations.”
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much in tune with the non-rights based, limited-government theory
that we have advocated in lectures and that is fleshed out in this
article.  As Judge Rogers saw it, the source of the Boumediene major-
ity’s error was in its failure to recognize that the Suspension Clause
is a limitation on congressional power and not merely a source of
individual rights.20  “The court appears to believe that the Suspen-
sion Clause is just like the constitutional amendments that form the
Bill of Rights,” she explained.21  “It is a truism, of course, that indi-
vidual rights like those found in the first ten amendments work to
limit Congress.  However, individual rights are merely a subset of
those matters that constrain the legislature.”22  In response, the ma-
jority questioned why Judge Rogers was “fixated on how to charac-
terize the Suspension Clause,” suggesting that, under her
constitutional theory, “aliens outside the United States are entitled
to the protection of the Separation of Powers because they have no
individual rights under the Separation of Powers.”23  The majority
mischaracterized Judge Rogers’ limited-government approach to
constitutional adjudication.  This perhaps accounts for the major-
ity’s failure to address the method’s relative virtues, instead simply
throwing up its hands: “Where the dissent gets this strange idea is a
mystery, as is the reasoning behind it.”24
This article will lift some of the mystery and uncover some of
the reasoning that supports a limited-government approach like
that espoused by Judge Rogers.  We focus in this article on the
plight of non-citizens detained extraterritorially without charge or
trial because such persons are at the greatest risk of suffering from
arbitrary detention and abuse by the U.S. government; of all the
individuals who might theoretically be subject to exercises of power
by the U.S. government, it is the discrete class of non-citizens who
are arrested and detained abroad that is by far the most vulnerable.
The U.S. government holds non-citizens in overseas prisons and in
Guanta´namo precisely because it believes that these are places in
20. Boumediene, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 at *45 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Id. (footnote omitted).  Judge Rogers went on to explain that:
[t]hese two sets[of rights] cannot be understood as coextensive unless the
court is prepared to recognize such awkward individual rights as Commerce
Clause rights, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, or the personal right not to
have a bill raising revenue that originates in the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 7, cl. 1.
Id.
23. Boumediene, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3682 at *35 (majority opinion) (em-
phasis added).
24. Id.
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the world where the government is accountable at law to no person
or judge.  Moreover, and despite the fact that it has recently moved
several high-value suspects from secret prisons to Guanta´namo, the
government has demonstrated its continued interest in exploiting
these putative legal black holes for the benefit of military and intel-
ligence personnel.  We firmly believe that any functioning theory of
extraterritoriality must be sufficiently robust to ensure that the U.S.
government cannot reasonably contend that there is any place on
earth entirely beyond the reach of law.25
In Section I, we describe our limited-government theory in
more detail.  In Section II, we discuss the development of the doc-
trine regarding the extraterritorial application of the Constitution
and explain why the limited-government approach best explains
this doctrine.  In Section III, we describe the major theories utilized
in precedent and advocated by scholars and explain why these theo-
ries fail to adequately to explain the doctrine or would not afford
protections to certain non-citizen detainees.  In Section IV, we ex-
plain why the limited-government approach is a better solution to
the “legal black holes” problem than rights-based theories.  Finally,
in Section V, we discuss the major objections to the limited-govern-
ment approach and avenues for further research.  As the title of
this article suggests, what we offer here is not a comprehensive ex-
plication or defense of the limited-government approach, but only
a beginning.26
One last preliminary note: The Guanta´namo litigation has
raised many important legal questions which profoundly affect
aliens held abroad but which are beyond the scope of this article.
For instance, we do not examine the extent to which international
25. Scholars have proposed other approaches to the issue of the extraterrito-
rial application of constitutional protections, but we do not discuss them here be-
cause they have not played a role in the development of the doctrine and are
therefore unlikely to win the support of the Court anytime soon. See, e.g., Diane
Marie Amann, Guanta´namo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 299-300 (2004) (ar-
guing that U.S. courts should apply international law to determine the applicability
and content of constitutional rights outside U.S. borders); Roosevelt, supra note 18
(arguing for an approach, based on conflicts of law principles, that would examine
the constitutional right at issue, and whether its application in a foreign context
will promote its domestic purpose).
26. For example, we do not explore or discuss the extent to which a limited-
government approach to this particular question was contemplated by the found-
ing generation. See J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global
Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007) (arguing from history and the text and struc-
ture of the Constitution that non-citizens abroad lack constitutional rights).  One
of the authors of this article is currently working on a project exploring this
question.
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laws and treaties afford protections to detainees.  Nor do we discuss
whether Congress may limit through legislation the executive’s au-
thority to detain “enemy combatants” abroad.  While we believe
that statutes, treaties, and international law speak clearly to these
questions and establish that aliens held outside of the sovereign ter-
ritory of the United States possess a variety of rights, we address in
the instant article only the degree to which the Constitution itself
protects persons in their situation.
I.
A LIMITED-GOVERNMENT APPROACH
The concept of limited government may seem counter-intui-
tive because we are accustomed to thinking of all limitations on
power as rights.27  But the concept is in fact deeply rooted in our
American legal tradition.28  Limited government follows directly
from the common, federalist understanding that the Constitution
establishes a national government with enumerated rather than ple-
nary powers.  As Sanford Levinson observed, “the central mantra of
the founding generation was that the national government estab-
lished by the 1787 Constitution was a ‘limited government of as-
signed powers,’ and that mantra retains its own power even in
2006.”29  Although the Founders may have disagreed among them-
selves about the scope of particular powers granted to the federal
government, the debates about the meaning of the Necessary and
Proper Clause demonstrate that the Constitution was not intended
to create any general, “freestanding” governmental powers.30  In
27. See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2054 (“[M]odern due process jurispru-
dence is typically concerned with what rights are contained in the Due Process
Clause, rather than the limits of governmental power.”).
28. One of the most famous early Supreme Court cases, Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), is in one sense a limited-government decision.  Be-
sides establishing that the role of the judicial branch is to decide the constitution-
ality of legislation, Marbury reinforced the limited-government principle simply by
declaring that there are limits to Congress’s power. Id. at 176 (“The powers of the
legislature are defined, and limited.”).
29. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40
GA. L. REV. 699, 708 (2006). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1435-41 (1987) (discussing the transition during the founding
generation from parliamentary supremacy under the British government to a new
concept of limited government, in which ultimate sovereignty resided in the Peo-
ple); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“The Constitution
creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.” (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
30. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY 173-90 (2003).  James Madison cautioned that the Necessary and
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Federalist No. 84, Alexander Hamilton argued that a Bill of Rights
was unnecessary—and that adding one to the Constitution would in
fact be dangerous—because its addition would suggest that the gov-
ernment’s powers were broader than their enumerations in the text
would indicate.31
Although we now think of the national government as having
very broad powers, the limited-government principle persists and
has been given new vitality in recent federalism decisions.  In United
States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, for example, the Court
struck down federal statutes on the ground that Congress had ex-
ceeded its power to regulate under the Commerce Clause.32  These
decisions recognized the importance of states as regulatory labora-
tories and separate “regulatory spheres” for the state and federal
governments; they also characterized the statutes in question as
straying from Congress’s textually-mandated authority to regulate
commercial and economic activity.33
Proper Clause should not be interpreted “to give an unlimited discretion to Con-
gress.”  2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1798.  Madison later expressed this general principle
during debates about the constitutionality of the proposed Bank of the United
States: “All power . . . had its limits; those of the general government were ceded
from the mass of general power inherent in the people, and were consequently
confined within the bound fixed by their act of cession.” Documentary History of the
First Federal Congress, in DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THIRD SESSION:
DECEMBER 1790-MARCH 1791, BIOGRAPHIES OF MEMBERS, 379 (William Charles
diGiacomantonio ed., 1995).  For discussion of this debate, see BARNETT, supra at
158-84.
31. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed., 1961) (“The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the
Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL
OF RIGHTS.”).  Others, including James Wilson of Pennsylvania and Charles
Pinckney of South Carolina, similarly warned that enumerating particular rights in
the Constitution would imply that the new government had been granted the
power to take away unenumerated rights. See BARNETT, supra note 30, at 56-57.
32. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (holding that Con-
gress exceeded its powers to legislate under the Commerce Clause by creating fed-
eral civil penalties for intrastate acts of violence motivated by gender); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its pow-
ers to legislate under the Commerce Clause by enacting a statute that made it a
federal crime to possess a firearm in a school zone). Lawrence v. Texas, in which
Justice Kennedy wrote the decision striking down a Texas statute prohibiting same-
sex sodomy, also arguably takes a limited-government, rather than rights-based,
approach, concluding that the statute “further[ed] no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). See also Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2053 n.176 (noting
the limited-government approach in Lawrence).
33. Some proponents of the new federalism regard Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1 (2005), as a setback. But Raich does maintain the limits of Lopez and Morrison by
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The limited-government approach we propose would similarly
examine the scope of the national government’s enumerated pow-
ers with respect to non-citizens outside its borders.  The foreign re-
lations powers of the national government are, like the power to
regulate commerce, subject to limits.34  When examining any exer-
cise of a foreign relations power, the first step must be to determine
whether particular exercises of government power are appropriate
by looking not to whether individuals possess rights (although they
do), but instead by asking whether the Constitution has granted the
government the particular power that it seeks to deploy.
This approach makes intuitive sense once we recognize that
the Constitution does not merely create rights; it also sets forth the
conditions under which the government may and may not regulate
pre-existing liberties.35  Stated another way, the Constitution estab-
lishes a framework under which certain “natural rights” or inherent
liberty interests (such as acquiring property or protecting oneself
from harm) are fully or partially surrendered in exchange for the
requiring that an “economic/commercial line” be satisfied for federal legislation
to be valid; the government does not have the “carte blanche” that arguably ex-
isted before these decisions. See George D. Brown, Counterrevolution? – National
Criminal Law After Raich, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 989-90 (2005).  Brown observes that
the majority opinion in Raich recognized an “economic/commercial line for evalu-
ating the validity of federal legislation” under the Commerce Clause and “empha-
sized the non-economic nature of the statutes at issue in Lopez and Morrison as both
the reason for their invalidity and the central distinction from the statute in Raich.”
Id. at 981.
34. The most well-known example of the Court recognizing constitutional
limits on foreign relations powers of the national government is the “Steel Seizure
Case,” in which the Court declared unconstitutional a presidential order authoriz-
ing seizure of the steel industry despite claims by the President that the seizure was
necessary for national defense. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 582, 589 (1952).  In Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, the Court up-
held a Depression-era moratorium on mortgage foreclosures against a Contracts
Clause challenge, concluding that the economic emergency created by the Depres-
sion made the statute necessary. 290 U.S. 398, 415-16, 444-45, 448 (1934).  In do-
ing so, the Court took pains to observe that the limited-government principle was
still vital and that “even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations
safeguarding essential liberties.” Id. at 426; see Levinson, supra note 29, at 728-29
(discussing Blaisdell).
35. As Randy Barnett has observed, the founding generation universally be-
lieved that people possessed “inherent” or “natural” liberty interests (or rights)
independent of those granted by the government and “by which the justice or
propriety of governmental commands are to be judged.” BARNETT, supra note 30,
at 54.  The concept that inherent or natural rights exist prior to, and despite, the
establishment of the government by the Constitution is one that has retained its
power over the years: the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments believed in
such inherent rights, as do most Americans today. See id. at 60-79.
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creation of alternate civil or positive rights.36  The purpose of this
bargain is to leverage the power of the state to maximize the exer-
cise of the citizenry’s full panoply of natural rights or liberties.37
With respect to the domestic context, to state this proposition
is to echo the words of the Declaration of Independence and the
Ninth Amendment.38  The ramifications of our theory for non-citi-
zens located abroad are different, however.  While it is true that
non-citizens located abroad are not parties to the Constitution and
may arguably be deemed to fall outside the sphere of civil or posi-
tive rights “created” by the Constitution, such outsiders likewise
have never surrendered any of their natural rights in exchange for
the civil or positive rights enjoyed by those participating in the na-
tional community.  It therefore follows that the U.S. government
may not abridge a non-citizen’s natural rights (such as the right to
be free from arbitrary, extrajudicial detention) absent an express
provision of such power legitimately and lawfully granted by the peo-
ple.39  The question is not, “What rights does the non-citizen have
36. See id. at 68-72.
37. Among the pre-existing liberty interests that are given up when one enters
society is the right to enforce one’s own rights, or the “executive power,” which in
a Lockean state of nature would remain with the individual. See id. at 69-71 (dis-
cussing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 370 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-
bridge University Press 1963 (1690))).
38. Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned . . . .), with U.S. CONST. amend. IX. (“The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”).
39. Many scholars of foreign affairs have argued that the Constitution should
be interpreted as extending the same rights (possibly in some diluted form) to
non-citizens abroad as it does to U.S. citizens. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 305-07 (2d ed. 1996); David Cole, Are Foreign
Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
367, 370-73 (2003); Jules Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 875-
76 (1989);  cf., Jordan J. Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and
Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and
Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1335, 1350 (2004) (stat-
ing that “no human being is without protection under international law and the
types of protection are many”).  This “universalist” approach is sometimes justified
on the ground that the Framers believed in natural rights and that they created a
government of limited powers. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra, at 306; Lobel, supra, at 875-
76; see also GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BOR-
DERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 5-6 (describing this approach as “universalist”).
However, it is important to distinguish the universalist approach of these scholars
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under the U.S. Constitution?” but rather, “What legitimate powers
over non-citizens has the U.S. government been granted under the
U.S. Constitution?”  Certainly this latter question may be a vexing
one to answer, requiring recourse to international law and histori-
cal practice.  What is clear to us, however, is that to answer it one
must look to the constitutional powers of the government and not
to the constitutional rights of the non-citizen.
The limited-government approach, as opposed to purely rights-
based approaches, recognizes that the initial burden must rest on
the government to justify its exercises of power—not on the individ-
ual to assert a right against the exercise of this power.40  Placing this
burden on the government enhances accountability for govern-
ment action and increases the likelihood that policies affecting lib-
erty will be carefully developed and grounded in legal principles.
The limited-government approach removes the possibility that the





Case law regarding the extraterritorial application of the Con-
stitution has developed in an erratic and incoherent fashion.41
from our limited-government theory.  Although both can be grounded in original
intent and the nature of the government created by the Constitution, it is possible
to reach radically different results in applying them.  Making the claim that the
government’s powers are limited is not the same thing as making the claim that
non-citizens abroad possess constitutional rights.  Although we are not prepared to
dismiss universalism out of hand, its principal flaw is that it is not supported by the
case law. See Part II infra.
40. Randy Barnett has argued for an interpretation of the Ninth Amendment
that would “place the burden on the government to show why its interference with
liberty is both necessary and proper rather than . . . imposing a burden on the
citizen to show why the exercise of a particular liberty is a ‘fundamental right.’”
BARNETT, supra note 30, at 260.
41. Scholars have noted that the doctrine allows for odd results. See Kal Raus-
talia, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2524-25 (2005) (“Yet while
Verdugo may well stand for the proposition that spatial location remains essential to
the rights of aliens against the U.S. government, that decision offered no coherent
theory for why this was true – when territoriality so demonstrably no longer ap-
plied to citizens – nor what might explain the various anomalies in the case law.”);
NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 101 (“It is hard to see the coherence of an approach
that leads to the conclusion that American citizens cannot be tried by the federal
government for capital offenses without jury trial in Japan but can be so tried in
Puerto Rico.”).
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These inconsistencies can be resolved, however, by viewing the
cases through a limited-government rather than a rights-based lens.
Analysis of whether non-citizen detainees held by the U.S.
abroad are protected in some manner by the Constitution must be-
gin with the Insular Cases, a series of decisions reached in the early
twentieth century in the imperial aftermath of the Spanish-Ameri-
can War.  The Insular Cases addressed the application of particular
constitutional provisions to litigants who were located in newly ac-
quired U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and
Hawaii.42  Although they did not directly address questions regard-
ing extraterritorial application of the Constitution, the Insular Cases
remain an important source for the Supreme Court’s modern un-
derstanding of the reach of the Constitution and the limits of fed-
eral power outside of the U.S.
In Downes v. Bidwell, the central and most famous of the Insular
Cases, the Court held that Congress could tax imports from Puerto
Rico despite the uniform taxation requirements in Article I and de-
spite the Court’s earlier holding that Puerto Rico was part of the
U.S.43  Justice Brown announced the Court’s judgment, concluding
that the Constitution applied in acquired territories only at the dis-
cretion of Congress.44  But it was Justice White’s approach, ex-
pressed in his concurring opinion, which prevailed in subsequent
cases.45  Justice White believed that the Constitution applies every-
42. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190
U.S. 197, 211, 217 (1903); DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 1-2, 200 (1901); Goetze v.
United States, 182 U.S. 221, 221-22 (1901); Dooley v. United States (Dooley I), 182
U.S. 222, 235-36 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243, 244 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 246-48 (1901); Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182
U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v. United States (Dooley II), 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Fourteen
Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901).  For a detailed discussion of
these cases, potential sources for the various approaches adopted by the Justices,
and the background of the litigation, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of the Plenary
Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (2002).
43. See Downes 182 U.S. at 251.  The Court had concluded that Puerto Rico
was part of the United States in Dooley I, 182 U.S. at 235.
44. Downes, 182 U.S. at 278-79 (opinion of Brown, J.) (“[T]he Constitution is
applicable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest only when and so far as
Congress shall so direct.”).  However, Justice Brown simultaneously observed that
the Constitution contained certain “prohibitions [that] go to the very root of the
power of Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place.” Id. at 277.
45. See id. at 288-89 (White, J., joined by Shiras & McKenna, J.J., concurring).
Justice Gray declared that he agreed “in substance” with Justice White, but empha-
sized the fact that the case involved a temporary government. Id. at 345-46 (Gray,
J., concurring).  White’s approach was explicitly adopted by the majority of the
court in Dorr, 198 U.S. at 13.
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where the U.S. government chooses to exercise power, because our
government is one of limited powers.  “The government of the
United States,” he explained “was born of the Constitution, and all
powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be either derived ex-
pressly or by implication from that instrument.”46
Justice White noted that particular limitations on government
power do not always apply in the same way in every place.47  Articu-
lating what has become known as the “doctrine of territorial incor-
poration,”48 he held that in incorporated territories—essentially,
those destined for statehood—all constitutional provisions and con-
stitutional rights apply.  In unincorporated territories, by contrast,
congressional power is limited in a different manner, by “inherent,
although unexpressed, principles which are the basis of all free gov-
ernment.”49  As he explained, there may be “restrictions of so fun-
damental a nature that they cannot be transgressed,” even though
they are not expressed in so many words in the Constitution.50
Thus, although Justice White’s opinion has often been character-
ized as establishing that fundamental “rights” are available in unin-
corporated territories,51 such a description is misleading, since in
the context of unincorporated territories he was consistently speak-
ing in terms of limits on government power rather than in terms of
rights.52
The Insular Cases and the incorporation doctrine they spawned
have justly been criticized for what Gerald Neuman calls their
“frank racism” and “enthusiastic colonialism.”53  In practice, the
doctrine proved a useful tool for withholding certain rights—such
as the Sixth Amendment rights to grand jury indictment and jury
trial—in territories already heavily populated by non-caucasian peo-
ple, while extending those rights in Alaska, which alone among the
new territories was deemed “incorporated” because of its low native
46. Downes, 182 U.S. at 288 (White, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 278-83.
48. See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE 195-96
(2004) (describing the doctrine as “murky”).
49. Downes, 182 U.S. at 290-291 (White, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 87.
52. See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2034-35 n.89.
53. Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 11
[hereinafter Neuman, Guantanamo]. See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 306 (White, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the U.S. had a right, as a sovereign nation on par
with the European powers, to “protect the birthright of its own citizens” by with-
holding citizenship from people in the acquired territories that belonged to “an
uncivilized race” and could be “absolutely unfit to receive it”).
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population and suitability for settlement by white Americans.54
Nonetheless, the underlying limited-government rationale of the
cases is sound, and they have been relied on by the Court as a pri-
mary source for its analysis of the extraterritorial application of the
Constitution.
The Court next grappled with the extraterritorial reach of the
Constitution in the context of World War II, in Johnson v. Eisen-
trager.55  The petitioners in Eisentrager were German nationals who,
after the cessation of hostilities, had been captured by U.S. forces in
China and accused of aiding the Japanese military in violation of
Germany’s surrender terms.  With the permission of the Chinese
government, the Germans were tried, convicted, and sentenced by
a congressionally-authorized military commission.56  The convicted
prisoners, who were transferred to a U.S. military base in occupied
Germany to serve out their sentences, filed habeas petitions chal-
lenging their detention on a variety of constitutional, statutory, and
treaty-based grounds.  Relying mainly on the German convicts’ sta-
tus as enemy aliens being detained abroad, Justice Jackson for a
majority of the Court held that the protections of the Great Writ
were not available to these petitioners.  Adopting a half-articulated
territoriality approach to the questions confronting the Court, he
described the various legal disabilities that had traditionally limited
court access to enemy aliens and the disadvantages of affording
habeas to enemy nationals captured, tried, and imprisoned abroad,
noting that “in extending constitutional protections beyond the cit-
izenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the
alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judi-
ciary power to act.”57  Though Justice Jackson in fact considered the
substance of the Germans’ claims, he rejected their contention that
the Fifth Amendment “conferred a right of personal security or an
immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy
engaged in [the] hostile service of a government at war with the
United States.”58
54. Compare Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (holding that
the Sixth Amendment applied to Alaska, which had been incorporated into the
United States), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92 n.29
(1970), with Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903) (holding that Fifth and Sixth
Amendment grand and petit jury protections did not apply to Hawaii).
55. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
56. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942) (“Congress has explicitly pro-
vided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have juris-
diction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.”).
57. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771.
58. Id. at 785.
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The territoriality approach underlying portions of Eisentrager
was seriously undermined by Reid v. Covert, a 1956 decision involv-
ing servicemen’s civilian widows who had been accused of capital
crimes.59  The Reid Court held that the widows, who were U.S. citi-
zens, could not be tried by court martial for capital crimes while
overseas.60  Justice Black’s watershed plurality opinion, adopting a
mode of analysis that would become  the majority approach in later
cases,61 established that American citizen civilians may invoke full
constitutional rights against the government anywhere in the world.
Justice Black’s opinion diverged from the Insular Cases’ doctrine as
far as American citizens were concerned,62 but in many respects re-
inforced the limited-government theme of Downes.63 Reid “rejected
the idea that when the United States acts against citizens abroad it
can do so free of the Bill of Rights.”64  Moreover, Justice Black rea-
soned, since the “United States is entirely a creature of the Consti-
tution,” its “power and authority have no other source” and it “can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution.”65
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter concurred in the result and
wrote separate opinions.  Unlike Justice Black, Justices Harlan and
Frankfurter reasoned from the Insular Cases, treating them as the
foundation of doctrine, rather than as precedent to be distin-
guished.66  Justice Harlan articulated a two-step analysis.  First, he
addressed the threshold question of whether the government
59. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
60. Id. at 32-33, 40-41.
61. The Reid holding was extended by a series of opinions. See, e.g., Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246-48 (1960) (extending Reid to de-
pendents of service personnel accused of non-capital crimes); Grisham v. Hagan,
361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (extending Reid from dependents of service personnel to
civilian employees of the armed forces accused of capital crimes); McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (extending Reid to civilian
employees of the armed forces accused of non-capital crimes).
62. Justice Black concluded that the Insular Cases were distinguishable be-
cause “they involved the power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to
govern temporarily territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions
whereas here the basis for governmental power is American citizenship.” Reid, 354
U.S. at 14.
63. See id. at 8-9 & n.10.  Justice Black, who believed in the wholesale incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment, clearly disliked the
territorial incorporation doctrine. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 91.
64. Reid, 354 U.S. at 5.
65. Id. at 5-6.  In this respect, Justice Black’s opinion was strikingly similar to
that of the D.C. Court of Appeals opinion that was eventually overruled in the
Eisentrager case. See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
66. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 92-93.
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power being invoked—in this case, Congress’s Article I power to
regulate the armed forces—existed at all.67  As Justice Harlan rea-
soned, only if there were a rational connection between a grant of
power and the exercise of the power in the particular case should
the Court ask whether it was appropriate to recognize the constitu-
tional rights at issue.  This second inquiry, he wrote, “can be re-
duced to the issue of what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the
particular circumstances of a particular case.”68  Justice Frank-
furter’s opinion adopted a similar approach, concluding that courts
must weigh the congressional power at issue against “the safeguards
of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”69
The Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid all played a role when
the Court next considered whether constitutional protections ex-
tended to non-citizens outside of U.S. territory.  In 1990, the Court
decided United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to searches by U.S. agents of property
that is owned by nonresident aliens and that is located in a foreign
country.70  The defendant in Verdugo-Urquidez was detained in a San
Diego prison while Drug Enforcement Agency agents searched his
home in Mexico, where they obtained evidence that they then
sought to use against the defendant in his trial in the U.S.  In his
opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist rebuked Verdugo-
Urquidez’s Fourth Amendment challenge to the admission of the
drug evidence, reasoning that the reference to “the People” in the
Amendment limits its application to “a class of persons who are part
of a national community or who have otherwise developed suffi-
cient connection with this country to be considered part of that
community.”71
Because Verdugo-Urquidez is the most recent Supreme Court
pronouncement on the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution, it
is worth discussing.  Two aspects of the Chief Justice’s opinion pre-
sent potential problems for a limited-government approach in the
67. Reid, 354 U.S. at 70 (Harlan, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 75.  Justice Kennedy quoted this language in his United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence.  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
69. Reid, 354 U.S. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
70. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 259, 274-75; see U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”).
71. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
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context of the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution.  First,
Chief Justice Rehnquist provides a very broad reading of the Eisen-
trager case, characterizing it as standing for the proposition that
aliens held “outside the sovereign territory of the United States”
lack any Fifth Amendment rights.72  In light of the Chief Justice’s
strong reading of Eisentrager, a number of courts subsequently read
Verdugo-Urquidez to be an acknowledgment that aliens detained ex-
traterritorially by the U.S. have no constitutional protections what-
soever.73  Such a conclusion is unwarranted.  As Professor Neuman
has persuasively argued, the Chief Justice’s dictum concerning
Eisentrager’s holding is selective and unnecessarily broad. Eisentrager
can and should be viewed only as a statutory case, in which the
Court held simply that self-declared enemy aliens who are impris-
oned abroad and who have been tried and convicted of war crimes
may not ask U.S. courts to have their convictions overturned.74
Moreover, the force of Eisentrager—and thus of the Chief Justice’s
opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez—has been muted by Rasul v. Bush,
where the Court stated explicitly that Eisentrager was a case that
turned on statutory rather than constitutional interpretation.75
A second apparent hurdle that Verdugo-Urquidez poses for the
adoption of our limited-government approach is the Chief Justice’s
constricted reading of Reid v. Covert.  The defendant in Verdugo-Ur-
quidez relied on Justice Black’s plurality decision in Reid and his ob-
servations that the U.S. is “entirely a creature of the Constitution,”
72. Id. at 269.
73. See, e.g., Al Oldah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir.
2003), overruled by Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v.
Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1428 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Verdugo-Urquidez as sup-
port for its “decision that the Cuban and Haitian migrants [held at Guanta´namo
Bay] have no First Amendment or Fifth Amendment rights”).  In the Guanta´namo
detainee litigation, the government continues to make this argument. See, e.g., In
re Guanta´namo Bay Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005)
(describing government’s interpretation of Rasul, in context of a motion to dismiss
post-Rasul petitions, as one in which district courts have jurisdiction to consider
habeas petitions, but must immediately dismiss such petitions because non-citizens
detained in Guanta´namo possess no substantive constitutional rights).
74. See Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 53, at 54-65.  Neuman observes that
Eisentrager is outdated for several reasons: it relies on Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188
(1948) (construing the habeas statute as making the location of petitioner key to
habeas jurisdiction), which was overruled prior to Rasul by Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1972); it relies on a territorially-restrictive con-
cept of constitutional rights exploded by Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); much of
its rationale for limiting access to habeas for aliens located abroad — logistical and
security concerns — has been undermined by technological advances enabling
proceedings via telecommunication.
75. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 467. See Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 53, at 54-65.
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that its “power and authority have no other source,” and that it “can
only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Con-
stitution.”76  The Chief Justice dismissed Verdugo-Urquidez’s argu-
ment that the Court “interpret this discussion to mean that federal
officials are constrained by the Fourth Amendment wherever and
against whomever they act.”77  The holding of Reid, he explained,
“stands for no such sweeping proposition,” since it was ultimately
the concurring justices, with their reliance on the fact that the de-
fendants in Reid were U.S. citizens, that provided the narrowest
grounds for decision in the case.78  Although Chief Justice Rehn-
quist’s discussion of Reid rejects application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to aliens abroad, it is hardly fatal for our limited-government
approach: a non-citizen does not lack protection from exercises of
government power merely because he lacks a particular right.
Moreover, the Chief Justice’s “majority” in Verdugo-Urquidez was
more apparent than real.  Justice Kennedy supplied the crucial fifth
vote for the case and joined the majority, but he also wrote sepa-
rately to provide “some explanation of my views,” which, he wrote,
“I do not believe . . . depart in fundamental respects from the opin-
ion of the Court.”79  Importantly, Justice Kennedy rejected sweep-
ing generalizations about the inapplicability of the Constitution to
protect non-citizens abroad.  Instead, specifically relying on Justice
Harlan’s Reid concurrence, Justice Kennedy focused on the particu-
lar “conditions and considerations” of particular cases, inquiring
whether the application of certain constitutional provisions in cer-
tain circumstances would be “impracticable and anomalous.”80
Neither Verdugo-Urquidez nor Eisentrager forecloses the possibil-
ity that aliens held abroad by the United States possess certain con-
stitutional protections, although Verdugo-Urquidez itself provides
76. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957) (plurality opinion)).
77. Id. at 271.
78. Id. As Gerald Neuman has observed, the opinion seems to disregard the
fact that the Reid plurality became the majority in later cases involving U.S. citizens
abroad. See Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 53, at 12-13 & n.64; see also Kinsella
v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (majority opinion extending Reid to depen-
dents of service personnel accused of noncapital crimes); Grisham v. Hagan, 361
U.S. 278, 280 (1960) (majority opinion extending Reid holding from dependents
of service personnel to civilian employees of the armed forces accused of capital
crimes); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (extending it to civilian
employees of the armed forces accused of non-capital crimes).
79. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
80. Id. at 282.
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little guidance about which protections are available to which per-
sons and in which locations.
Still, it seems clear to us that any theoretical approach to the
question of whether aliens detained abroad possess constitutional
rights must be supported by the center point of the doctrine—the
Harlan-Kennedy approach outlined in their Reid and Verdugo-Ur-
quidez concurrences.  It is the limited-government theory that best
harmonizes the Harlan-Kennedy approach with the earlier prece-
dent: the limited-government approach is the common thread that
runs through the full range of “extraterritoriality” cases.  In Downes,
Justice White described the core constitutional protections afforded
to residents of unincorporated territories as “absences” of govern-
ment power, not as “fundamental rights.”81  As discussed above, in
their respective Reid concurrences, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan
analyzed whether the government was empowered by the Constitu-
tion to try the civilian defendants by court martial.82  Justice Harlan,
in particular, treated the scope of government power as a threshold
issue to be analyzed before considering how to apply the specific
constitutional rights in a foreign context.83  Justice Kennedy essen-
tially adopted Justice Harlan’s approach wholesale in his Verdugo-
81. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 297-98 (1901) (White, J., concurring)
(asserting that “those absolute withdrawals of power which the Constitution has
made in favor of human liberty are applicable to every condition or status”).  The
Downes opinions can be understood as an argument about the appropriate applica-
tion of a limited-government approach.  Chief Justice Fuller’s dissenting opinion,
joined by three other justices, also struck the limited-government theme. See id. at
359 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (“The powers delegated by the people to their agents
are not enlarged by the expansion of the domain within which they are exercised.
When the restriction on the exercise of a particular power by a particular agent is
ascertained, that is an end of question.”).  Even Justice Brown acknowledged the
existence of “such prohibitions as go to the very root of the power of Congress to
act at all, irrespective of time or place,” mentioning as examples the provisions
forbidding ex post facto laws, titles of nobility, and even the First Amendment. Id.
at 277 (majority opinion).  In Lamont v. Woods, the Second Circuit concluded that
an overseas religious program violated the Establishment Clause, relying on
Downes for the proposition that “the constitutional prohibition against establish-
ments of religion targets the competency of Congress to enact legislation of that
description — irrespective of time or place.” Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 834-
35 (2d Cir. 1991). See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2049 (“Invocations of limited
government are common in the extraterritoriality case law.”).
82. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 53 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at
70 (Harlan, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 70 (Harlan, J., concurring).  Justice Frankfurter, in contrast, ana-
lyzed the power and the right together. See id. at 53 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Urquidez concurrence.84  Indeed, the limited-government approach
ties together, in an unstrained fashion, the full range of opinions in
Verdugo-Urquidez85 with the exception of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
plurality-like majority.86
The door remains open for the Supreme Court to clarify that a
limited-government theory provides an appropriate way of analyz-
ing questions of extraterritoriality, and the Court can utilize such a
theory in future cases without engendering an upheaval in its own
precedent.  The same cannot be said of other popular theories re-
garding the application of the Constitution abroad.
III.
THEORIES OF A GLOBAL CONSTITUTION
Many theoretical approaches to the question of the extraterri-
torial application of the Constitution have, of course, been pro-
posed over the years and were utilized by the Supreme Court in
developing the doctrine.  But for the most part, these methods have
focused attention on the circumstances under which particular con-
stitutional rights should be extended to particular individuals in
particular locations.  These “who-where-what” theories share at least
one of two essential flaws: they either do not fully explain Supreme
Court doctrine, or they would allow for the creation of legal black
holes.  In this section, we discuss the major theories.
84. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice
Kennedy began with, as a “first step,” the principle that “the Government may act
only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or
domestic.” Id.  He then quoted extensively from Justice Harlan’s concurrence and
used the identical language to evaluate whether the application of the Fourth
Amendment to this presumably valid exercise of government power, the extraterri-
torial search of Verdugo-Urquidez’s home, would be “impractical and anomalous.”
Id. at 277.
85. See id. at 262 (noting that Mexican law enforcement officials authorized
the search of Verdugo-Urquidez’s residence); id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“The Court today creates an antilogy: the Constitution authorizes our Govern-
ment to enforce our criminal laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise
this authority, the Fourth Amendment does not travel with them.  This cannot
be.”); id. at 289 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Although the Government’s exercise
of power abroad does not ordinarily implicate the Fourth Amendment, the en-
forcement of domestic criminal law seems to me to be the paradigmatic exercise of
sovereignty over those who are compelled to obey.”).
86. See id. at 261 (majority opinion).
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A. Territoriality and Membership
Our overview begins with two approaches, commonly referred
to as the “territoriality” and “membership” theories, which have in
practice merged in the case law and scholarship.87
Under a strict territoriality approach, the Constitution is un-
derstood to apply only within U.S. territory.  This view was articu-
lated by the Supreme Court near the end of the nineteenth century
in In re Ross, where Justice Field stated succinctly that “the Constitu-
tion can have no operation in another country.”88  This straightfor-
ward approach, however, has not fared well over the years.  As
noted above, for instance, Reid v. Covert established that constitu-
tional rights can apply extraterritorially, at least for U.S. citizens.89
In addition, the approach is inconsistent with the indisputable fact
that certain constitutional provisions, such as the Commander-in-
Chief Clause and the clause granting Congress the power to punish
crimes “on the high Seas,”90 explicitly contemplate extraterritorial
application of the powers they endow.  A strict territoriality ap-
proach would also fail to account for Congress’s undisputed power
to enact legislation with extraterritorial effect.91  As Kermit
87. Gerald Neuman describes these two approaches as composing a single,
“membership” approach that “treats certain individuals or locales as participating
in a privileged relationship with the constitutional project, and therefore entitled
to the benefit of constitutional provisions.”  Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 53,
at 6-7.  Neuman has analyzed the history of the application of the Constitution in
the territories and abroad as essentially a conflict between this general member-
ship approach and a mutuality-of-obligation approach, which we discuss below. See
NEUMAN, supra note 39.
88. In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1891).  The petitioner in Ross was a sea-
man on an American merchant vessel charged with murder of a fellow
crewmember aboard the ship in a harbor in Japan.  He was tried and sentenced to
death by a court consisting of a U.S. consul general and four U.S. citizens (his
sentence was later commuted and he was imprisoned in the U.S.). See Cleveland,
supra note 42, at 204-06 (discussing In re Ross).  He argued that this process de-
prived him of the right to a grand jury indictment and jury trial.  Relying largely on
the rationale that the Constitution did not apply outside U.S. territory, the Court
rejected his appeal. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. at 465.
89. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 12 (1956) (“The Ross approach that the Constitu-
tion has no applicability abroad has long since been directly repudiated by numer-
ous cases.”).
90. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (the Commander-in-Chief Clause); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power “[t]o define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas”).
91. See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2044; Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 53
at 45.
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Roosevelt has observed, “[I]f Congress and state legislatures can
project power beyond their borders, so too can We the People.”92
But the territoriality approach is far from dead.  As discussed
above, it was an important part of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis
in Verdugo-Urquidez.93  In addition, Justice Kennedy cited In re Ross,
which has never been explicitly overruled, in his concurrence in
Verdugo-Urquidez, though he interpreted it (along with the Insular
Cases) as standing “for the proposition that we must interpret con-
stitutional protections in light of the undoubted power of the
United States to take actions to assert its legitimate power and au-
thority abroad.”94  Territoriality, in short, has survived as a single
factor in a broader constitutional analysis.
A component of that broader analysis is the membership ap-
proach to extraterritoriality.  Under a membership theory, constitu-
tional rights are understood to increase as an individual’s
connection to U.S. society increases.  It is the membership ap-
proach that is really at the heart of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opin-
ion in Verdugo-Urquidez.95 Drawing on dicta in Eisentrager, Chief
Justice Rehnquist describes a series of concentric circles in which
non-citizens can be placed closer or further from the center of the
“national community,” depending on their status as residents or
nonresidents in the U.S. and whether they are in the country volun-
tarily or involuntarily.96  As a person is located further and further
from the center of the circles—further and further from the na-
tional community—his or her rights are diminished accordingly.
Pursuant to this approach, aliens who are detained abroad and
have no previous connection to the United States are on the far
outer edge of this framework and are entitled to virtually no consti-
tutional protections from the exercise of U.S. governmental power.
92. Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2044.
93. See 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990).
94. See id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
95. This approach has also been labeled a “social contract” model because it
would reserve the benefits of the Constitution largely to “the People” of the Ameri-
can community who, in a general sense, established the Constitution. See
Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2046-47.
96. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 106-07.  Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted Justice
Jackson’s statement that an “alien . . . has been accorded a generous and ascend-
ing scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.” Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. at 269 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)).  As
Professor Neuman has pointed out, however, it is not clear whether Justice Jackson
was discussing statutory, rather than constitutional, rights. See NEUMAN, supra note
39, at 250 n.21.
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As discussed above, however, we do not believe that this mem-
bership approach has prevailed, notwithstanding Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez for a technical majority.
Instead, Justice Kennedy’s Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence is probably
closer to the actual position of the Court today.  While Justice Ken-
nedy denies the existence of a “juridical relation” between “our
country and some undefined, limitless class of noncitizens who are
beyond our territory,” he also acknowledges that “the Government
may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in
question are foreign or domestic.”97  Justice Kennedy’s concur-
rence thus assigns the membership approach, like the territoriality
approach, an important, though not exclusive, role in analyzing the
application of the Constitution abroad.
B. Mutuality-of-Obligation
A mutuality-of-obligation theory is also worth considering here
because it has played an important, albeit primarily dissenting, role
in the development of extraterritoriality doctrine.  Adherents to
this approach contend that when the U.S. government compels a
non-citizen to act pursuant to its legitimate legal authority, the U.S.
government itself simultaneously assumes a reciprocal obligation to
afford the non-citizen concomitant constitutional rights.  Variations
of this approach can arguably be found in Justice Brennan’s dissent
in Verdugo-Urquidez and Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in
Downes.98  Neuman, among the strongest defenders of this theory,
argues for a version that would establish a presumption that consti-
tutional rights apply “to aliens abroad only in those situations in
which the United States claims an individual’s obedience to its com-
mands on the basis of its legitimate authority.”99  Against this pre-
sumption, according to Professor Neuman, the government may
assert only “specific textual or other arguments [that] may excep-
tionally demonstrate that a particular right is either reserved to citi-
zens or geographically limited.”100
97. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
98. Neuman believes that Harlan expounded a mutuality-of-obligation ap-
proach in his Downes dissent. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 87.  We read Harlan as
ultimately adopting the same limited-government approach as his colleagues. See
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 385 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“By whomso-
ever and wherever power is exercised in the name and under the authority of the
United States, or of any branch of its Government, the validity or invalidity of that
which is done must be determined by the Constitution.”).
99. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 99-100.
100. Id. at 99.
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The mutuality-of-obligation approach has strong intuitive ap-
peal.  However, it does not provide any protection to non-citizens
who are detained extraterritorially (and without charges or trial) if
the government is not itself asserting any obligation on the part of
the non-citizen to comply with U.S. laws.  That, of course, is pre-
cisely the position in which the detainees at Guanta´namo, Bagram,
Kandahar, and other detention centers around the world find
themselves.  Because the government asks for nothing from these
prisoners, even under a mutuality-of-obligation theory it would con-
sider itself obliged to provide no constitutional protections in re-
turn.  Indeed, the detention of aliens in black-box prisons is, and is
meant to be, an exercise of raw power for which no justification is
deemed necessary.101  Professor Neuman acknowledges this diffi-
culty in his discussion of the status of detainees at Guanta´namo Bay.
After arguing that the detainees have rights under a mutuality-of-
obligation approach, he concludes: “If the Government denies that
foreign nationals have any rights, then it is engaging in an exercise
of naked force in confining them at Guanta´namo.  Force may be
justified on the battlefield, but not in secure territory against help-
less captives who protest their innocence.”102  The ultimate issue is
not whether the detainees’ “rights” are being respected in the pro-
cess that has been provided them, but whether the government’s
exercise of power is justified—that is, whether it is authorized by
the Constitution.  This, of course, is a question of limited
government.
C. Pragmatic Due Process or Global Due Process
As we discussed above, the current theoretical approach to ex-
traterritoriality in the Supreme Court is evolving.  For now, Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo-Urquidez, which leaves open the
possibility that non-citizens are entitled to certain constitutional
protections, appears to be the reigning analysis.  The challenge for
Justice Kennedy’s approach going forward, however, is to give spe-
cific content to the constitutional protections that may be available
to non-citizens being detained extraterritorially.
Justice Kennedy’s approach to the extraterritoriality question
has been described as a “global due process” theory.103  Only re-
cently have defenders of a flexible due process approach come to
the fore, including Professor Tung Yin, who argues that no prece-
101. See Neuman, Guantanamo, supra note 53, at 52.
102. Id.
103. NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 113-14.
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dent actually precludes recognition of procedural due process
rights for non-citizens detained abroad in the war on terror.  In-
deed, Professor Yin has articulated a general framework for those
rights based on other non-criminal detention contexts.104
We are sympathetic to Professor Yin’s project, and we agree
that neither the Constitution itself nor anything in the case law
forecloses the possibility that non-citizens detained abroad are enti-
tled, at a minimum, to fundamental due process rights.  We believe,
however, that there is a serious problem with purely pragmatic ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation, since the content of the
“rights” theoretically available under such approaches remains un-
grounded and is ultimately dependent on the values that the deci-
sionmaker brings to his or her analysis of the question.105
For instance, how is the court to determine what process is due
to a non-citizen being detained abroad as an “enemy combatant”
and accused of sending money to an organization that, unbe-
knownst to her, itself funnels money to a terrorist organization?106
Is the detainee entitled to a hearing?  To speak in her own defense?
To obtain counsel?  Does the military context of the detention fac-
tor into the equation?  Is the U.S. government’s assertion that the
entire world is a battlefield in our  “Global War on Terror” entitled
to any weight when addressing these questions?  What process, if
any, is due to persons who are caught up in the U.S. military’s ter-
ror-war dragnet?  Due process is, of course, the most protean of
concepts, appropriately flexible in practice but notoriously difficult
to generalize about in theory in a manner that would give guidance
to jurists.  Adopting a pragmatic approach to the question, it is im-
possible to determine a priori the scope of due process rights to
104. See Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine “Enemy Combatant” Status
in the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REV. 351, 354 (2006).  Professor Yin offers a
model that suggests detainees should be afforded a hearing, appointed counsel,
and reasonable right to present evidence. Id. at 400-414.
105. See R. George Wright, Dependence and Hierarchy Among Constitutional Theo-
ries, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 141, 145-61 (2004).
106. Senior Judge Joyce Hens Green offered this hypothetical to counsel for
Respondents in a hearing addressing the Government’s motion to dismiss the
habeas petitions of all of the Guanta´namo prisoners:
A little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity
that helps orphans in Afghanistan but really is a front to finance al-Qaeda
activities.  Would she be considered an enemy combatant or supporting [a
terrorist organization]?”  The Government’s remarkable response was that the
“little old lady” could indeed be taken into custody and held by the military as
an “enemy combatant.”
See Transcript of Motion to Dismiss, at 25-26, Rasul v. Bush (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 03-
334).
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which detainees would be entitled.  Giving content to the due pro-
cess rights must ultimately reduce, whether tacitly or overtly, the
credence given to other theoretical approaches to the Constitution,
such as the territoriality or membership approaches that we dis-
cussed earlier.
In addition, as a practical matter, flexible approaches are in-
herently more susceptible to manipulation.107  If, for example, a
court holds that on balance a non-citizen held at Guanta´namo Bay
must be afforded access to counsel, since the base is in a secure
zone far from the battlefield, the United States will simply stop
transferring non-citizens to that location in the future,108 and may
even seek to move detainees out of Guanta´namo to avoid giving
effect to the court’s ruling.109
A healthy dose of pragmatism and a willingness to balance
competing governmental and private interests are certainly neces-
sary to achieve a workable approach to constitutional interpretation
in the extraterritorial context.  We acknowledge that in the realm
of foreign affairs the government must be afforded more deference
and allowed more flexibility than in the domestic context. But these
107. See NEUMAN, supra note 39, at 115.
108. In fact, the Government ceased transferring detainees to Guanta´namo in
2003. See Mayer, supra note 17, at 37-38 (describing internal wrangling in the Bush
administration over the value of shipping detainees to Guanta´namo once the
courts established that the Executive was not immune from judicial oversight).
109. Fearing such a course of events, in March 2005 we filed an emergency
application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to keep
the military from transferring our clients from Guanta´namo unless they afforded
us 30-days’ advance notice.  Our fears were that such a transfer would remove the
court’s de facto jurisdiction over our clients’ habeas cases and that our clients
might be subjected in the foreign country either to torture or indefinite detention
at the behest of the U.S. government. See Petitioners’ Ex Parte Motion for Tempo-
rary Restraining Order to Prevent Respondents from Removing Petitioners from
Guanta´namo Until Petitioners’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction is Decided,
Abdah v. Bush, 04-CV-1254, (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2005) (on file with the authors) (not-
ing, among other things, that a “classified document in the factual return of [a
petitioner], for example, demonstrates beyond doubt that the Department of De-
fense, as recently as March 17, 2004, contemplated rendering [petitioner] to a
foreign country for interrogation under torture”).  The motion for a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction was granted.  Subsequently, many de-
tainees have applied for and received similar protection from the courts.  Sadly,
not all have.  For example, several ethnic Uighurs—men whom the military con-
ceded were not enemy combatants and had been detained wrongfully at Guanta´-
namo for more than four years—were transferred from Guanta´namo to a refugee
camp in Albania.  China is at present pressuring Albania to extradite these men
and, if the extradition demand is successful, the ethnic Uighurs face the prospect
of torture and likely execution upon return to China. Abu Bakker Qassim, Op-Ed,
The View From Guanta´namo, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 17, 2006, at 4.15.
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same realities also counsel that some solid boundaries be identified
beyond which our government may not stray.  Some fundamental
principles of restraint must be acknowledged, lest our government
actors come to believe that the flexibility and deference to which
they are entitled means, in practice, that there are no limits to their
power and that they are entirely unconstrained by our Constitution.
IV.
RIGHTS AND LEGAL BLACK HOLES
Having canvassed the chief academic theories addressing the
extraterritorial reach of the Constitution, we believe it is clear that
the core problem with each of them is the manner in which they
frame their inquiries: Which rights are possessed by which persons in
which location?  Such questions may have been appropriate in the
past, when the U.S. government was essentially reactive and had not
yet embarked on its post-9/11 efforts to find and detain suspected
terrorists in overseas locations often hundreds if not thousands of
miles away from any conventional battlefield.  While a certain theo-
retical inconsistency may underlay the “who-what-where” rights ap-
proaches, in practice the flaws remained hidden from view.
Indeed, historically such approaches provided the courts with a rea-
sonable, if not particularly coherent, way in which to adjudicate
what protections non-citizens are entitled to.
These approaches function reasonably well, in other words,
when the non-citizen can be placed somewhere on a chart that
measures his proximity to the U.S. in terms of geography, status,
and rights.  For example, if the non-citizen who invokes a constitu-
tional right is an illegal alien living within the United States, he is
entitled to due process of law.110  The same holds for a non-citizen
living abroad who is sued in the United States.111
The poverty of these approaches, however, has been made
manifest since the initiation of our Global War on Terror.  Since
late 2001, the United States has taken into custody and detained
literally thousands of non-citizens all around the globe and has uni-
formly denied them anything that remotely resembles constitu-
110. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose pres-
ence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that consti-
tutional protection [of due process].”).
111. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987) (holding
that a nonresident located abroad is entitled to due process when sued in a U.S.
court).
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tional protections.112  With only rare exceptions, including, to a
large extent, Judge Green’s ruling in In re Guanta´namo Detainee
Cases,113 the courts have been flummoxed by the government’s ar-
gument that precedent dictates that non-citizens detained abroad
have no rights.
The U.S. government has argued that it may detain non-citi-
zens extraterritorially without according them any due process be-
cause non-citizens detained extraterritorially possess no rights.  The
conventional understanding of limits on government power as be-
ing derived from rights and immunities possessed by the individual
leaves such detainees with no protections from even arbitrary exer-
cises of U.S. power against them.
Such a result is repulsive to anyone who retains respect for the
rule of law.  It is non-intuitive and defies common sense that the
agents of the U.S. government may act utterly without restraint any-
where in the world against a non-citizen.  May the U.S. detain an
alleged “enemy combatant” in a secret site in Siberia, absolutely in-
communicado, for a decade?  May the U.S. torture the detainee or
oversee his torture?114  May the U.S. summarily execute the de-
tainee?  On what theoretical grounds would the answer be no to
any of these questions?  Although Justice Kennedy’s approach in
Verdugo-Urquidez would appear to offer the possibility that the U.S.
government would be restrained from acting in the above ways, it is
112. See, e.g., Josh White & Julie Tate, 4 Men Cleared of Terrorism Links But Still
Detained, WASH. POST, May 20, 2006, at A18 (noting that, according to a Pentagon
spokesman, more than 10,000 persons have been taken into custody by the United
States in and around Afghanistan since early 2002).
113. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005).
114. The DTA ostensibly forbids any torture or inhuman treatment by any
U.S. actor anywhere around the globe.  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-148, § 1005 (2005) (“No individual in the custody or under the physical
control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical loca-
tion, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
The President, however, signaled in his executive signing statement that he would
not be bound by the plain language of the law:
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating
to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the
President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander-in-
Chief and consistent with the constitutional limitations on the judicial power,
which will assist in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the
President, evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from fur-
ther terrorist attacks.
Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hur-
ricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, P.L. 109-148, 2006,
Statement of President George W. Bush Upon Signing of H.R. 2863, Dec. 30, 2005.
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radically unclear to what protections such a detainee might be
entitled.
These difficulties largely disappear, however, when we shift our
focus away from trying to determine which rights the individual
possesses and instead focus on which powers the government has
been authorized by the Constitution to exercise.  If the government
is not empowered by the Constitution to take a certain action, then
the geography, citizenship status of the individual, and legal con-
text in which his claim is brought are made irrelevant.  For exam-
ple, if the Constitution does not empower the U.S. government to
engage in torture, then the government may not torture an individ-
ual in its custody regardless of where the person is being detained.
Whether the detainee is being kept in Kansas or Kazakhstan, the
government is not empowered to torture him.
V.
PROBLEMS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER INQUIRY
The central problem facing any limited-government theory of
constitutional interpretation is the difficulty of defining limits and
discerning appropriate standards regarding the scope of govern-
ment power.115  The case law provides little guidance, and it is in
fact the rare case in which any exercise of government power has
been declared unconstitutional on the ground that the government
has exceeded its grant of power rather than on the ground that an
individual’s right has been violated.116  In general, decisions after
the Lochner era hold that the legislature rather than the judiciary is
better equipped to discern the limits of its own power.117  And in
light of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation,118 it is not
115. See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2056; see generally NEUMAN, supra note 39.
116. See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2054.
117. See id. at 2053-54 (discussing cases).
118. 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936) (rejecting a challenge, on non-delegation doc-
trine grounds, to a joint resolution permitting the President to enforce a criminal
prohibition on the sale of arms in the United States to countries engaged in a war
in South America).  The doctrine articulated in Justice Sutherland’s opinion is that
the federal foreign affairs power was inherent in the sovereignty of the United
States and not dependent on the Constitution for its source. See id.  For an in-
depth discussion of the roots of the doctrine articulated in Curtiss-Wright, see gen-
erally Cleveland, supra note 42.  It is doubtful, however, that this “inherent powers”
thesis remains valid in light of Reid. Curtiss-Wright is cited in contemporary cases
rather for the principle that the President is authorized by the Constitution, and
not some other source, to take a lead role in foreign policy and may act without
congressional authority. See Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 n.9
(2002) (referring to “Justice Sutherland’s reading of the National Government’s
‘inherent’ foreign affairs power”).  In his Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, Justice
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absurd to ask whether any limits of this nature can or should be
placed on the government’s power in the realm of foreign
affairs.119
These legitimate challenges are not insurmountable, although
it is well beyond the scope of this brief article to provide the full
response that they deserve.  In order to lay the groundwork for a
fuller exploration of these themes, however, we offer the following
fundamental propositions relating to the extraterritorial detention
of non-citizens.
First, even assuming that there exists a radical uncertainty re-
garding the limits of national power abroad, the limited-govern-
ment theory has significant explanatory utility.  As we discussed in
Part IV, the limited-government approach best explains why certain
protections should be afforded to all individuals, including those
who are furthest from the geographical United States and furthest
from the national community, even if the precise nature of those
protections is uncertain.
Second, we believe that a fair reading of the extraterritorial
cases we have discussed above clearly establishes that, whether or
not the powers granted the government with respect to foreign af-
fairs are necessarily broader and more flexible than their domestic
counterparts, the detention of individuals by the U.S. government
must still be justified as relating to a particular enumerated
power.120  Just as the Court in Downes considered the scope of the
Kennedy cited Curtiss-Wright for the proposition that “we must interpret constitu-
tional protections in light of the undoubted power of the United States to take
actions to assert its legitimate power and authority abroad.” United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 282 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2051-52 (noting that, despite intense criti-
cism from scholars, Curtiss-Wright is still cited in support of broad authority for the
government in foreign affairs matters). Curtiss-Wright, of course, has been roundly
criticized by scholars. See Cleveland, supra note 42, at 6; see also David M. Levitan,
The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J.
467, 497 (1946) (Curtiss-Wright made a “shambles out of the very idea of a constitu-
tionally limited government.”); James Quarles, The Federal Government: As to Foreign
Affairs, Are Its Powers Inherent as Distinguished from Delegated?, 32 GEO. L.J. 375
(1944); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990)
(“Curtiss-Wright painted a dramatically different vision of the National Security
Constitution from that which [had] prevailed since the founding of the Repub-
lic.”).  Professors Jack Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley have also challenged Curtiss-
Wright in a series of articles. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 816, 861-70 (1997); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and
Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1659-60 (1997).
120. Although scholars often assume that Congress has a “general” power to
legislate with respect to foreign affairs, this assumption has little grounding in the
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Territories Clause and the Court in Reid considered the scope of
Congress’s power to regulate the armed forces, the detention of
non-citizens abroad should trigger a searching examination of the
scope of Congress’s and the President’s power to deprive individu-
als of liberty.121  Although we acknowledge that the government has
wider latitude for the exercise of its enumerated powers in foreign
contexts than in domestic ones, there is still room for courts to de-
termine whether a particular exercise of power is appropriate with
reference to the purpose of the power being exercised.122
Finally, it follows from this—and ultimately, from the Insular
Cases—that the exercise of any foreign relations power, no matter
how broadly conceived, is restricted by certain absolute constitu-
tional limits on all government powers.123  These limitations are
concededly difficult to define and their relationship to specific
rights enumerated in the Constitution is complex.  But they are dis-
cernible from our founding documents, from our case law, from
text of the Constitution and “the enumerated foreign affairs powers of Congress,
while seemingly broader than the President’s, also do not apparently encompass
the full extent of the foreign affairs powers Congress is thought properly to exer-
cise.”  Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001).  Professors Prakash and Ramsey have con-
cluded that Article II of the Constitution vests the President with a broad array of
foreign affairs powers not specified in the text; this is known as the “Vesting Clause
Thesis” and has spurred an interesting debate. Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Martin
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545,
551-52 (2004) (rejecting the Vesting Clause Thesis) with Saikrishna B. Prakash &
Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 1591, 1687 (2005) (defending the Vesting Clause Thesis).
121. For example, the power to detain aliens may be said to derive from the
President’s Commander-in-Chief power, while the rules governing the detention
and treatment of alien detainees may derive from Congress’s power to regulate the
armed forces.
122. Here we part ways with Kermit Roosevelt, who concludes that the nature
of the powers granted Congress to legislate regarding foreign affairs would prevent
the sort of analysis undertaken in the federalism cases such as Lopez or Morrison.
See Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2051-52 & n.170.  As Roosevelt admits, however,
even the existence of general, rather than enumerated, powers, does not preclude
recognizing fundamental limitations that derive from the nature of the powers
exercised. Id. at 2052.  For example, the limitations on a state’s general “police”
power can be ascertained by looking to the purposes of the police power and
whether that purpose is advanced by a particular exercise of that power. See BAR-
NETT, supra note 30, at 333-34.
123. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“It may well be
doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some
limits to the legislative power.”); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)
(“The nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it.”). For a
discussion of these cases, see Roosevelt, supra note 18, at 2052.
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our common-law traditions and—most intriguingly—from natural
rights.124  These sources establish that a zone of liberty exists, how-
ever narrow, into which no just government can intrude.125
To take an example, the Bill of Rights can serve as a guide for
determining the nature of fundamental limitations on the govern-
ment’s power.  The courts are fully able to discern the fundamental
principles of liberty and justice embodied in these enumerated
rights and to hypothesize from them that we the people have cho-
sen not to authorize the government to act in a manner contrary to
the spirit of these fundamental dictates.126  That is not to say that
each of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights is necessarily
applicable to non-citizens being held extraterritorially.  To the con-
trary, the Supreme Court has, for better or worse, already estab-
lished that this cannot be the case.127  Rather, the government may
be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate that the Constitution
does somewhere authorize its exercise of such power.  Only if the
government is unsuccessful and fails to locate the source of its
asserted power will the Court determine that it acts
unconstitutionally.
CONCLUSION
Our purpose in this short piece has been to provoke discussion
rather than to present our audience with a digested and fully
formed theory of limited government and extraterritorial constitu-
tionality.  After years of litigating on behalf of clients who have
124. See BARNETT, supra note 30, at 54.  It may seem contradictory to refer to
natural “rights” when our enterprise is to move away from discussions of rights
altogether and shift the focus to limits on government powers.  However, we in-
voke the concept of natural rights because that is the way in which the founding
generation conceptualized the core limitations on government power.  Natural
rights were believed to be universal, to have both preceeded and survived the foun-
dation of the government, and were a means of judging the propriety of govern-
mental actions. See id.
125. See id. at 73 (“Together, these abstract natural rights define a boundary
or jurisdictional space within which people should be free to make their own
choices.”); Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (“It is against all reason and justice for
people to entrust to a legislature with [certain] powers; and therefore, it cannot be
presumed that they have done it.”).
126. We do not believe that utilizing standards articulated in due process
cases is to abandon the limited-government approach. But see Roosevelt, supra
note 18, at 2055.  Despite the predominant modern shift to a rights-centered un-
derstanding, a limited-government approach can co-exist with, and complement,
rights-oriented approaches.
127. See supra Part II.  This is why we cannot fully endorse the “universalist”
approaches advocated by many scholars of foreign affairs. See supra note 39.
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been imprisoned by the U.S. military without charge or trial, we
have grown increasingly cognizant of the degree to which the pre-
sent administration feels itself bound by no law when operating
outside of the sovereign territory of the United States.  As we note
above, the courts may, in the end, find it unnecessary to determine
the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution in order to resolve the
rule-of-law crisis presented by Guanta´namo, for the simple reason
that Guanta´namo is, practically speaking, not “extraterritorial” in
anything but a technical sense.  Soon, however, habeas corpus and
similar court challenges will emanate from detainees being held in
our detention facilities in Bagram, Kandahar, and “black sites”
around the globe.
When the detainees or their representatives bring those chal-
lenges, will the courts struggle to discern what “rights” those men
and women have?  Or will the courts instead ask whether the U.S.
government is empowered to engage in the extra-judicial, indefi-
nite detention of non-citizens abroad and to treat those detainees
in an inhumane manner?  We believe that to ask the “rights” ques-
tion—and only the “rights” question—would be myopic and that its
effect would be to ignore the general thrust of extraterritorial case
law that has developed over more than a century.  Too narrow a
focus on “rights” will unnecessarily exempt from scrutiny transgres-
sions of the natural limits that any just and democratic society must
be assumed to place on its government.  We believe that whether or
not non-citizens have a constitutional “right” to be free from tor-
ture or extra-judicial detention abroad by the U.S. government, the
courts may recognize that the U.S. government does not have a
“right” to act in this manner.  Ours is a government of limited
rights, and We the People have not empowered our government to
torture non-citizens or to detain them abroad indefinitely without
judicial supervision.
